Democracy may contribute to friendly attitudes and positive attitudes toward outgroups (i.e., outgroup tolerance) because members of democratic societies learn to exercise their rights (i.e., cast a vote) and, in the process, listen to different opinions. Study 1 was a survey study with representative samples from 33 countries (N = 45, 070, 53.6% female) and it showed a positive association between the levels of democracy and outgroup tolerance after controlling for gender, age and the rate of immigrants influx from 2010 (...) to 2013. Study 1 demonstrated that members in countries with higher political participation and civil liberty showed greater tolerance toward immigrants. In Study 2, we conducted an experimental study in Taiwan (N = 93, 67.7% female) to further examine two potential mediators (opinion sharing and voting) of the effect of democratic system on tolerance toward outgroups (i.e., attitudes toward mental patients) after controlling for gender and age. We found that when individuals were allowed to share opinions and vote, they had the highest positive other-oriented emotions toward mental patients, which in turn led to greater tolerance toward outgroups compared to those who were not allowed to share opinions or vote. In general, these results demonstrated that the democratic system plays a critical role in increasing outgroup tolerance. Limitations of the two studies and implications regarding opinion sharing, voting, democratic systems, and effects on outgroup tolerance are discussed. (shrink)

Behavior, language, development, identity, and science—all of these phenomena are commonly characterized as 'social' in nature. But what does it mean to be 'social'? Is there any intrinsic 'mark' of the social shared by these phenomena? In the first book to shed light on this foundational question, twelve distinguished philosophers and social scientists from several disciplines debate the mark of the social. Their varied answers will be of interest to sociologists, anthropologists, philosophers, psychologists, and anyone interested in the theoretical foundations (...) of the social sciences. (shrink)

Contemporary clinical ethics was founded on principlism, and the four principles: respect for autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence and justice, remain dominant in medical ethics discourse and practice. These principles are held to be expansive enough to provide the basis for the ethical practice of medicine across cultures. Although principlism remains subject to critique and revision, the four-principle model continues to be taught and applied across the world. As the practice of medicine globalizes, it remains critical to examine the extent to which (...) both the four-principle framework, and individual principles among the four, suffice patients and practitioners in different social and cultural contexts. Using the four-principle model we analyze two accounts of surrogate decision making – one from the developed and one from the developing world – in which the clinician undertakes medical decision-making with apparently little input from the patient and/or family. The purpose of this analysis is to highlight challenges in assessing ethical behaviour according to the principlist model. We next describe cultural expectations and mores that inform both patient and clinician behaviors in these scenarios in order to argue that the principle of respect for persons informed by culture-specific ideas of personhood may offer an improved ethical construct for analyzing and guiding medical practice in a globalized and plural world. (shrink)

This paper begins with a contrast between two different views about whether the five sensory consciousnesses are accompanied by vikalpa. For the Abhidharmakośa, the five sensory consciousnesses are accompanied by the svabhāva-vikalpa whose nature is vitarka; but for Yogācāra, the five sensory consciousnesses are without that particular kind of svabhāva-vikalpa because vitarka is regarded as belonging merely to the mental consciousness. My hypothesis for explaining such difference is that Yogācāra assigns that particular kind of svabhāva-vikalpa to mental consciousness rather than (...) to the five sensory consciousnesses. I then look for possible functions of vitarka-vicāra that could map to svabhāva-vikalpa: (a) conceptual vitarka-vicāra in an unconcentrated state; (b) conceptual vitarka-vicāra in a concentrated state; (c) nonconceptual vitarka-vicāra in an unconcentrated state; (d) non-conceptual vitarka-vicāra in a concentrated state. I argue that the svabhāva-vikalpa in the Abhidharmakośa should map to (c) and (d), which in Yogācāra maps to mental perception (mānasapratyakṣa) stipulated by Dignāga. This refers to the discernment of the shape of a cognitive object in the foreground against the background. I end this paper with some general observations about why Yogācāra maps the svabhāvavikapla to the mental consciousness, and about the different senses covered by the Buddhist notion of vikalpa, which is broader than the sense of "conceptualization" as we now understand it. (shrink)

This dissertation argues that the Yogâcāra Buddhism transmitted by the Indian translator Paramârtha (Ch. Zhendi 真諦) underwent a significant transformation due to the influence of his later Chinese interpreters, a phenomenon to which previous scholars failed to paid enough attention. I begin with showing two contrary interpretations of Paramârtha’s notion of jiexing 解性. The traditional interpretation glosses jiexing in terms of “original awakening” (benjue 本覺) in the Awakening of Faith and hence betrays its strong tie to that text. In contrast, (...) a contrary interpretation of jiexing is preserved in a Dunhuang fragment Taishō No. 2805 (henceforth abbreviated as T2805). The crucial part of this dissertation consists in demonstrating that T2805 and the Awakening of Faith represent two competing lineages of the interpreters of Paramârtha. The first clue is that modern scholars have voiced objection to the traditional attribution of the Awakening of Faith to Paramârtha. In addition, I discovered that striking similarities exist between T2805 and Paramârtha’s corpus with respect to terminology, style of phrasing, and doctrine. I further draw attention to the historical testimonies about two different doctrinal views held by Paramârtha’s interpreters. Therefore, I argue that there were two lineages in the name of Paramârtha’s disciples around 590 CE: the indirect lineage interpreted Paramârtha through the lens of the Awakening of Faith; and the direct lineage—represented by T2805—preserved Paramârtha’s original teachings but died out prematurely. Later Chinese Buddhist tradition mistakenly regards the indirect lineage as Paramârtha’s true heir and attributes the Awakening of Faith to Paramârtha. This implies that Paramârtha may have agreed with Xuanzang 玄奘 (600-664) much more than scholars used to assume. For example, Xuanzang’s characterization of the notion of “aboriginal uncontaminated seeds” looks very similar to how Paramârtha depicts jiexing. It also implies that we should distinguish the strong sense of the notion of “tathāgatagarbha” in the Awakening of Faith from its weak sense. The fact that even Vasubandhu endorses the weak sense of “tathāgatagarbha” strongly challenges the received wisdom that Yogâcāra and Tathāgatagarbha were two distinct and antagonistic trends of thought in India. (shrink)

Understanding the meaning of a sentence is crucial for Buddhists because they put so much emphasis on understanding the verbal expressions of the Buddha. But this can be problematic under their metaphysical framework of momentariness, and their epistemological framework of multiple consciousnesses. This paper starts by reviewing the theory of five states of mind in the Yogācārabhūmi, and then investigates debates among medieval East Asian Yogācāra thinkers about how various consciousnesses work together to understand the meaning of a sentence. The (...) major differences between the various explanations proffered lie in the minimum number of types of consciousnesses involved, and the minimum linguistic marks cognized, in order for one to understand a sentence consisting of four Chinese characters. I show that in these disputes, two points are key: First, the role played by the mental consciousness that arises simultaneously with a sensory consciousness: that is to say, whether a sensory consciousness should still be regarded as essential for understanding, if the simultaneous mental consciousness also cognizes the same mark. Second, whether the syntactic structure of a sentence is taken into consideration: that is to say, whether there is a separate determination of understanding regarding each character, or there is no determination until one has heard two or more characters and takes them as a syntactically meaningful unit. (shrink)

CHAPTER I CLAUDE FLEURY AND HIS CAREER Claude Fleury (-), an educator, historian , jurist, cleric, royal tutor, and immortel of the ...

This paper advocates learned in the religious context of liberation, the "theology," a concept can be reasonably applied to religious traditions other than Christianity. According to that "beyond the world community and how the phenomenon of contact" as a general theological issues, and Consciousness-only school of Buddhism, one of the major literature of the "photo Mahayana theory of" how to respond to this issue. In the "photo Mahayana theory" in this issue of "inaction of the Dharma Realm to save sentient (...) beings in the phenomenal world and promising" in the form of presentation. This stands for "photo Mahayana theory" to this problem, but through three Buddha body of theory. In short, the body of law to the Buddha Dharma and sentient beings as a contact intermediary. On the one hand, body of law as a Buddha in the phenomenal world to attend the results, which do not transcend the phenomenal world; other hand, the body of law were no wisdom to properly recognize the judicial system, and therefore associated with the Dharma Realm. Further, the body of law can not smell, good enough for practical enlightenment through the body of living beings must engage with the changes in the body, while the body of law and the relationship between the other two, is equivalent to no difference between the intellect and wisdom after that relationship. Finally, the "photo Mahayana theory" liberation school structure and Christianity's "Christology" of relief to make a simple comparison study architecture, and as a conclusion. This paper begins with arguing that within the larger context of soteriology, the notion of "theology" can be legitimately applied to other religious traditions than Christianity. Following this, I propose that the issue of how the realm of transcendence could relate to the realm of phenomenon can serve as an example of a general theological issue across religious boundaries. I then investigate how this issue is discussed in the Mahāyānasamgraha as a seminal text in the Buddhist Yogācāra tradition. In the Mahāyānasamgraha, the above issue is formulated as the question of how unconditioned Dharma-realm could save the sentient beings in the conditioned world. I argue that the asnwer provided in the Mahāyānasamgraha hinges on its theory of three bodies of the Buddha. In short, the Dharma-body bridges between the Dharma-realm and sentient beings. On the one hand, the Dharma-body is the result of a bodhisattva's enduring practice in the phenomenal world, and hence does not transcend over the phenomenal world; on the other hand, the Dharma-body correctly knows the Dharma- realm through the non-discriminating cognition , and hence relates to the Dharma-realm. Furthermore, since sentient beings cannot see the Dharma-body, they can be taught only by the Enjoyment-body and the Transformation-body of the Buddha. The relation between the Dharma-body and the other two bodies is identical to the relation between the non-discriminating cognition and the subsequently-acquired cognition . Finally, this paper ends with a brief comparison between the soteriological scheme in the Mahāyānasamgraha and the scheme reflected in the issue of Christology. (shrink)

It is commonly agreed that logic studies the form of arguments and that the concept of a consequence relation is based on the idea of truth-preservation in all models. Based on some observations about arguments involving conditionals, Brogaard and Salerno argue that the consequence relation should be defined in terms of truth-preservation within one fixed context. I will argue that Ichikawa’s contextualism for counterfactuals can be treated as an elucidation of what they have in mind. Instead of standing for or (...) against Stalnaker’s or Lewis’s semantics of counterfactuals, I will argue that the key to explaining the phenomena in question is the concept of a consequence relation. To support the point above, logical contextualism or relativism will be introduced and defended. I thus suggest that the concept of a consequence relation is sensitive to the context in which a certain argument is asserted. (shrink)

It is commonly agreed that logic studies the form of arguments and that the concept of a consequence relation is based on the idea of truth-preservation in all models. Based on some observations about arguments involving conditionals, Brogaard and Salerno argue that the consequence relation should be defined in terms of truth-preservation within one fixed context. I will argue that Ichikawa’s contextualism for counterfactuals can be treated as an elucidation of what they have in mind. Instead of standing for or (...) against Stalnaker’s or Lewis’s semantics of counterfactuals, I will argue that the key to explaining the phenomena in question is the concept of a consequence relation. To support the point above, logical contextualism or relativism will be introduced and defended. I thus suggest that the concept of a consequence relation is sensitive to the context in which a certain argument is asserted. (shrink)

There is a well-entrenched schism on the frequency, intensity, and evolutionary significance of warfare among hunter-gatherers compared with large-scale societies. To simplify, Rousseauians argue that warfare among prehistoric and contemporary hunter-gatherers was nearly absent and, if present, was a late cultural invention. In contrast, so-called Hobbesians argue that violence was relatively common but variable among hunter-gatherers. To defend their views, Rousseauians resort to a variety of tactics to diminish the apparent frequency and intensity of hunter-gatherer warfare. These tactics include redefining (...) war, censoring ethnographic accounts of warfare in comparative analyses, misconstruing archaeological evidence, and claiming that outside contact inflates the intensity of warfare among hunter-gatherers. These tactics are subject to critical analysis and are mostly found to be wanting. Furthermore, Hobbesians with empirical data have already established that the frequency and intensity of hunter-gatherer warfare is greater compared with large-scale societies even though horticultural societies engage in warfare more intensively than hunter-gatherers. In the end I argue that although war is a primitive trait we may share with chimpanzees and/or our last common ancestor, the ability of hunter-gatherer bands to live peaceably with their neighbors, even though war may occur, is a derived trait that fundamentally distinguishes us socially and politically from chimpanzee societies. It is a point often lost in these debates. (shrink)

Saturn and Melancholy remains an iconic text in art history, intellectual history, and the study of culture, despite being long out of print in English. Rooted in the tradition established by Aby Warburg and the Warburg Library, this book has deeply influenced understandings of the interrelations between the humanities disciplines since its first publication in English in 1964. This new edition makes the original English text available for the first time in decades. Saturn and Melancholy offers an unparalleled inquiry into (...) the origin and development of the philosophical and medical theories on which the ancient conception of the temperaments was based and discusses their connections to astrological and religious ideas. It also traces representations of melancholy in literature and the arts up to the sixteenth century, culminating in a landmark analysis of Dürer's most famous engraving, Melencolia I. This edition features Raymond Klibansky's additional introduction and bibliographical amendments for the German edition, as well as translations of source material and 155 original illustrations. An essay on the complex publication history of this pathbreaking project - which almost did not see the light of day - covers more than eighty years, including its more recent heritage. Making new a classic book that has been out of print for over four decades, this expanded edition presents fresh insights about Saturn and Melancholy and its legacy as a precursor to modern interdisciplinary studies. (shrink)

Freud’s psychoanalytic theory of morality is often regarded as a deflationist one, to the effect that it takes morality ‘s authority as a sheer product of human irrationality originating in the formation of the superego, and that it should be discarded on pain of its harmful effects on human life. In this paper, I shall discuss three views on this deflationist reading of Freud: that he is right in holding the alleged moral deflationism; that he is wrong in holding it; (...) and that this deflationism is wrong, but he may not actually hold it at all. I attribute the first two views to the philosophers Richard Wollheim and Samuel Scheffler, and argue that both accounts of psychoanalytic moral psychology are inadequate, because they fail to appreciate the role of irrationality in a person’s search for the good life. I then propose a non-deflationist reading of Freud, according to which both the loving and authoritative aspects of morality are deeply rooted in our human nature, and a truly fulfilling life requires more a balancing between the two than an elimination of irrationality. The appreciation of Freud’s moral naturalism, in effect, will require us to drop the presumption that rationality is the only source of goodness. (shrink)

In The Thread of Life, Richard Wollheim argues that a person's sense of value is grounded in the power of love to generate certain favourable perceptions of an object. Following from his view is a psychoanalytic conception of valuing as constituted by the imaginative force of phantasy, rather than rational deliberation. In this paper, I shall defend this conception with a view to explaining the relation between values and desires. I suggest that valuing qua phantasy-making can ‘tune up’ a person's (...) desires to fit his perception of the good. Such power of phantasy is to be contrasted with various types of motivational failure in moral imagination. Finally, I argue that ‘effective valuing’, which makes us capable of desiring what we perceive to be good, requires an affective kind of imagination which assures us that we have the ability to love and to be loved. (shrink)

The body of this essay is free of philosophical jargons. Since however some readers are accustomed to thinking about the free-will problem in terms of the compatibilism/incompatibilism divide, I wish to briefly comment on why this emphasis is not very helpful. If by “freedom” one means that a person’s will is the ultimate choicemaker free from prior causes, then the position of this essay is that “freedom is incompatible with determinism”; but if by “freedom” one means that there is harmony (...) between the intended consequences of a choice and the nature of the choice-maker, the position of this essay is that “freedom is compatible with determinism.” This illustrates that unless there is first an agreement on what is meant by “freedom,” it is premature to put the focus on whether freedom is compatible with determinism. (shrink)

What are the origins of human difference? The Hand, which is the first part of a bold philosophical inquiry into the nature of the difference between human beings and other animals, argues that it is the result of a complex sequence of events which began several million years ago with the evolution of the human hand.Possession of a fully developed hand profoundly transformed the relationship of the human being to its own body, thus altering the relationship between humans and the (...) natural world. The interaction of the hand with the rest of the body brought about self-consciousness and laid the foundations for the unique sense of agency that is experienced by humans. Crucially, the hand inspired the tool-use that has come to dominate human life and which has led to the emergence of the complex symbolic systems - most importantly language - that underpin civilisation.The book also celebrates the hand in human life: the almost miraculous complexity of its manipulative, exploratory and communicative functions. Raymond Tallis combines philosophical reflection with a light-hearted look at gestures, the role of each finger, the origins of numbers - and the case for and against what he names 'handkind'.The Hand is the first of three volumes. The other titles are I Am: A Philosophical Inquiry into First-Person Being and The Knowing Animal: A Philosophical Inquiry into Truth and Knowledge. (shrink)

Vasubandhu’s Twenty Stanzas (Viṃśikā) is among the most influential anti-Realist philosophical treatises in the history of Indian Buddhism. In particular, his refutation of the theories about the accumulation of atoms (paramāṇu) in stanza 12 if often regarded as compelling or even conclusive. But if this is the case, then the transition from stanza 12 to 13 would seem very odd, because in stanza 13 Vasubandhu bothers himself with yet another version of atomic accumulation. In this paper, I give an interpretation (...) of stanzas 12–13 by drawing clues from the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and Dharmapāla’s Dasheng guangbailun shilun (Taishō 1571). I argue that Vasubandhu’s refutation in stanza 12 is valid only if we assume that the only possible way atoms can accumulate is by means of physical contacts with neighboring atoms. Conversely, if the opponents do not accept this assumption, then Vasubandhu’s refutation would miss its target. Given that stanza 13 cites the theory of the Kāśmīravaibhāṣikas and seeks to refute it, we must interpret that the Kāśmīravaibhāṣikas hold that atoms can form an accumulation in which atoms do not come into physical contact with each other, because this would be the only way to deal with the challenge previously posed in stanza 12. Dharmapāla provides more details about this theory and seeks to refute it again. Assuming the same Vasubandhu to be the author of Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, in which the author deals with the same issue, we must judge that Vasubandhu himself is quite aware of the limitations of his refutation in stanza 12, and this explains why he feels the need to devote stanza 13 to further refuting the theory of the Kāśmīravaibhāṣikas. However, I also argue that Vasubandhu’s refutation of this theory fails. If my argument holds, then we must conclude that the refutation of the accumulation of atoms in the Twenty Stanzas may not be successful. This explains, at least in part, why Dignāga feels the need to find new arguments in his Ālambanaparīkṣā. (shrink)

The Tao Te Ching is a principal text of the ancient Spiritual tradition of Chinese Taoism. It is a compilation of wisdom sayings attributed to Lao Tzu, the old boy/philosopher/Master, recorded over two-thousand years ago and which has since undergone hundreds of translations, commentaries and adaptations. Tao Te Ching maxims are wise counsel given by sages to feudal rulers on how to harmoniously order their states and peacefully govern their peoples at a time in Chinese history of pervasive (...) socio-political conflict and upheaval. The wisdom sayings have become universally meaningful and perennially relevant guidelines for successful leadership as well as for optimal living. The present work is an original rendering of the 81 Tao Te Ching passages wherein identifying with the essential Reality of Tao and its dynamic-kinetic energetic characteristics, qualities and activities are considered to constitute the unique individuality, true integrity, innate wisdom and potent Virtuosity of our inner human nature. The psychotherapeutically-oriented commentaries given for each of the passages are not only useful for professionals engaged in the attending relationship/process of psychotherapy but also for anyone interested in wisely and Soulfully living a more Spiritually awakened, natural, contented and enjoyable human life."--Amazon.com. (shrink)

ISBN 0-7914-3529-6 (hard : alk. paper). — ISBN 0-7914-3530-X (pbk. : alk. paper ) 1. Dewey, John, 1854-1952. I. Title. II. Series: SUNY series in philosophy of education. B945.D4B65 1997 191— dc 21 96-52291 CIP 10 987654321 For Jayne ...

Odtworzenie założeń antropologicznych filozofii historii i wolności ludzkiej Merleau-Ponty'ego możliwe jest jedynie w konfrontacji z myślą Husserla i stanowiskami strukturalistycznymi. Merleau-Ponty polemizuje z francuską orientacją neokantowską. Orientacja ta tak określa podstawową kategorię a priori, iż pojawia się na jej gruncie nieprzezwyciężalny dualizm ja transcendentalnego i ja empirycznego, ja myślącego i obiektu myśli. Krytykując neokantyzm, Merleau-Ponty znajduje się pod silnym wpływem Husserla. Husserl proponuje nowe spojrzenie na "temat transcendentalności", głębsze od Kantowskiego. Kant nie potrafił przezwyciężyć "kryzysu nauki europejskiej" interpretując Galileuszowską wizję (...) matematyzacji natury Jako aprioryczną strukturę podmiotu ludzkiego. Nie udało się odsłonić duchowych źródeł nowożytnego traktowania natury, jego sensu dla człowieka. Brak również u autora "Krytyki czystego rozumu" obecności problematyki bezwzględnego pierwszeństwa prerefleksyjnego kontaktu z bytem. Husserl uwyraźnia potrzebę skonstruowania bardziej radykalnej, tj. bliższej realnych źródeł ludzkiego istnienia, wersji a priori (aprioryzmu). Opiera się on na podstawowym założeniu priorytetu tego, co przeżyte prerefleksyjnie w stosunku do syntezy naukowej. Prerefleksyjność posiada swą immanentną organizację, którą można utożsamić z językiem naturalnym. Wychodząc od prerefleksyjności przeżycia świata i naturalności języka można zbudować przejście od konkretności percepcji do idealności obiektu logiczno-naukowego. Właściwie określona kategoria a priori pozwala stworzyć nowy typ refleksji filozoficznej, który umożliwia zniesienie dualizmu ja transcendentalnego i ja empirycznego, i który można określić Jako "nieskończoną medytację". Pojawia się także możliwość potraktowania podmiotu ludzkiego już nie w perspektywie pozaczasowej aktywności konstytutywnej, formalizującej i syntetyzującej materiał dany z zewnątrz, lecz jako wszechstronnie aktywnego uczestnika sytuacji biosocjokulturowej. Jednakże w pełni twórcza kontynuacja poszukiwań fenomenologicznych Husserla przez Merleau-Ponty'ego jest możliwa dzięki zainteresowaniom strukturalizmem. Wykorzystanie myślenia strukturalistycznego jest u Merleau-Ponty'ego pochodną lektur teoretyków behawioryzmu, psychoanalizy i teorii postaci, dopełnionych lingwistyką strukturalną i etnosocjologią. Pojęcie struktury ma duży walor operacyjno-metodologiczny w naukach humanistycznych, a jej znaczenie dla filozofii wyraża się w tym, że jest ona "miejscem unaoczniania się sensu", zarazem narzędziem, jak i obiektem rozumienia. Operowanie strukturami umożliwia wyjście poza konstelację: podmiot-przedmiot, dominującą od Kartezjusza do Hegla. Pozwala także zobaczyć podmiot ludzki w świecie społeczno-historycznym, człowieka poprzez obecność w świecie i uspołecznienie poprzez człowieka. (shrink)

Kant’s religious ethics is grounded in a practical philosophy where ‘God’ is subordinated to moral principles. To accomplish this goal, Kant dismantled the onto-theological groundwork of religion and the conventional method of attaching morality to God, as if morality was a consequence of religious belief. In this essay, I will show how Kant replaces the metaphysics of being with the metaphysics of morality. More importantly, I will show how Kant’s thesis of moral theism argues that the practical philosophy does not (...) end with the categorical imperative, but that Kant also thinks morality inevitably leads to religious belief. (shrink)